



# The Glasgow climate pact, annotated

By Washington Post Staff

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After two weeks of talks in Glasgow, diplomats from almost 200 countries have agreed to ramp up their carbon-cutting commitments, phase out some fossil fuels and increase aid to poor countries on the front lines of climate change.

[\*\[At COP26, nations speed climate action but leave world still headed for dangerous warming\]\*](#)

The agreement will not put the world on track to avoid catastrophic warming beyond 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit). But officials said it represents a significant step on a path to a safer future.

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## Glasgow Climate Pact

*The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement,*

## *Recalling Article 2 of the Paris Agreement<sup>1</sup>,*

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<sup>1</sup> Article 2 of the Paris agreement set a target of holding global warming to “well below” 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) and trying to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) above preindustrial levels.

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*Also recalling decisions 3/CMA.1 and 1/CMA.2, Noting decision -/CP.26,*

*Recognizing the role of multilateralism in addressing climate change and promoting regional and international cooperation in order to strengthen climate action in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty,*

*Acknowledging the devastating impacts of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic<sup>2</sup> and the importance of ensuring a sustainable, resilient and inclusive global recovery, showing solidarity particularly with developing country Parties,*

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<sup>2</sup> The pandemic prevented the summit from happening at all in 2020 and threatened to derail the postponed conference this year. It hovered over the proceedings — both because of the risks it posed to attendees, huddled in windowless negotiating rooms, and because the inequities of vaccine access amplified the sense among many developing countries that wealthy countries don’t care about them.

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*Also acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to*

development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,

*Noting* the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including in forests, the ocean and the cryosphere, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, and *also noting* the importance for some of the concept of ‘climate justice’<sup>3</sup>, when taking action to address climate change,

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<sup>3</sup> “Climate justice” is the umbrella cause that brought 100,000 protesters into the streets of Glasgow during COP26. It is about ensuring that efforts to address climate change take into account human rights and social inequality, and its mention this high in the deal in part reflects sustained pressure from activists and civil society groups. But many of those groups were disappointed to see the issue framed as important only “for some.”

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*Expressing appreciation* to the Heads of State and Government who participated in the World Leaders Summit in Glasgow and for the increased targets and actions announced and the commitments made to work together and with non-Party stakeholders to accelerate sectoral action by 2030,

*Recognizing* the important role of indigenous peoples, local communities and civil society, including youth and children, in addressing and responding to climate change, and *highlighting* the urgent need for multilevel and cooperative action,

## **I. Science and urgency**

1. *Recognizes* the importance of the best available science for effective climate action and policymaking;
2. *Welcomes* the contribution of Working Group I to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report and the recent global and regional reports on the state of the climate from the World Meteorological

Organization<sup>4</sup>, and *invites* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to present its forthcoming reports to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in 2022;

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<sup>4</sup> The debate in Glasgow was driven in part by a report released in August by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a United Nations body responsible for assessing scientific research, which described how humans have altered the environment at an “unprecedented” pace and detailed how catastrophic impacts lie ahead unless the world rapidly and dramatically cuts greenhouse gas emissions. An October report from the U.N. weather agency warned about a looming water crisis, with floods, droughts and other water-related disasters on the rise.

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3. *Expresses alarm and utmost concern* that human activities have caused around 1.1°C of warming to date, that impacts are already being felt in every region, and that carbon budgets consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal are now small and being rapidly depleted<sup>5</sup>;

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<sup>5</sup> Carbon budget refers to how much carbon dioxide humanity can afford to emit over time. The latest Global Carbon Budget report estimated that the world has just 11 years of burning carbon at the current rate if humanity hopes to avoid catastrophic warming. The United States, which has the highest historical emissions of any country, was among the delegations that resisted this mention in the text.

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4. *Recalls* Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, which provides that the Paris Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances;

5. *Stresses* the urgency of enhancing ambition and action in relation to mitigation, adaptation and finance in this critical decade to address the gaps in the implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement;

## II. Adaptation

6. *Notes with serious concern* the findings from the contribution of Working Group I to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report, including that climate and weather extremes and their adverse impacts on people and nature will continue to increase with every additional increment of rising temperatures;

7. *Emphasizes* the urgency of scaling up action and support, including finance, capacity-building and technology transfer, to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change in line with the best available science, taking into account the priorities and needs of developing country Parties;

8. *Welcomes* the adaptation communications and national adaptation plans submitted to date, which enhance the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions and priorities;

9. *Urges* Parties to further integrate adaptation into local, national and regional planning<sup>6</sup>;

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<sup>6</sup> “Adaptation” is about making life adjustments as the climate changes. It includes modifying behaviors or systems in the face of shifting temperatures, sea levels, precipitation and other weather and climate patterns. A recent study found that at least 85 percent of the world’s population has been affected by climate change.

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10. *Requests* Parties that have not yet done so to submit their adaptation communications in accordance with decision 9/CMA.1 ahead of the fourth

session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (November 2022) so as to provide timely input to the global stocktake;

11. *Recognizes* the importance of the global goal on adaptation for the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement, and *welcomes* the launch of the comprehensive two-year Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation;

12. *Notes* that the implementation of the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme will start immediately after the third session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

13. *Invites* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to present to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session the findings from the contribution of Working Group II to its Sixth Assessment Report, including those relevant to assessing adaptation needs, and *calls upon* the research community to further the understanding of global, regional and local impacts of climate change, response options and adaptation needs;

### **III. Adaptation finance**

14. *Notes with concern* that the current provision of climate finance for adaptation<sup>7</sup> remains insufficient to respond to worsening climate change impacts in developing country Parties;

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<sup>7</sup> As climate disasters intensify and the prospects for avoiding even more catastrophic warming grow dim, U.N. experts say the world must spend five to 10 times more helping vulnerable people adapt to inevitable environmental upheaval.

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15. *Urges* developed country Parties to urgently and significantly scale up their provision of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for adaptation so as to respond to the needs of developing country Parties as part of

a global effort, including for the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans and adaptation communications;

16. *Recognizes* the importance of the adequacy and predictability of adaptation finance, including the value of the Adaptation Fund in delivering dedicated support for adaptation, and *invites* developed country Parties to consider multi-annual pledges;

17. *Welcomes* the recent pledges made by many developed country Parties to increase their provision of climate finance to support adaptation in developing country Parties in response to their growing needs, including contributions made to the Adaptation Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund, which represent significant progress compared with previous efforts;

18. *Urges* developed country Parties to at least double<sup>8</sup> their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources, recalling Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement;

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<sup>8</sup> Getting this increased financial commitment was a key COP26 goal for many developing countries. They also successfully pushed for far more to be spent on adaption rather than on initiatives that avoid future emissions.

19. *Calls upon* multilateral development banks, other financial institutions and the private sector to enhance finance mobilization<sup>9</sup> in order to deliver the scale of resources needed to achieve climate plans, particularly for adaptation, and *encourages* Parties to continue to explore innovative approaches and instruments for mobilizing finance for adaptation from private sources;

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<sup>9</sup> Money doesn't always go directly from a government's treasury to a developing country. In fact, often funds for developing countries are not public at all. This calls

on the private sector to invest in climate projects, particularly for projects that help with adaptation to climate change.

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## IV. Mitigation

20. *Reaffirms* the Paris Agreement temperature goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels<sup>10</sup>;

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<sup>10</sup> “Keep 1.5 alive” has been a rallying cry for diplomats and activists alike at the COP26 negotiations. The phrase refers to the goal — agreed in previous U.N. climate summits — of limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) above preindustrial levels. It’s seen as the threshold beyond which the effects of climate change become increasingly dangerous to people and ecosystems. But scientists warn that time is running out for humanity to take the transformative steps needed to achieve the 1.5 goal. And according to multiple estimates, the deal negotiated in Glasgow does not bend the curve enough to get there.

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21. *Recognizes* that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5°C compared with 2°C<sup>11</sup> and *resolves* to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C;

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<sup>11</sup> The difference between 1.5°C and 2°C may seem small, but they represent vastly different levels of effort for countries seeking to limit their carbon footprints and strikingly divergent outcomes for the planet. This year’s landmark IPCC report concluded that “every additional 0.5°C of global warming causes clearly discernible increases in the intensity and frequency” of heat waves, heavy rain and droughts.

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22. *Recognizes* that limiting global warming to 1.5°C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing



global carbon dioxide emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 relative to the 2010 level and to net zero around mid-century, as well as deep reductions in other greenhouse gases;

23. *Also recognizes* that this requires accelerated action in this critical decade, on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and equity, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty;

24. *Welcomes* efforts by Parties to communicate new or updated nationally determined contributions, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies and other actions that demonstrate progress towards achievement of the Paris Agreement temperature goal;

25. *Notes with serious concern* the findings of the synthesis [report on nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement](#), according to which the aggregate greenhouse gas emission level, taking into account implementation of all submitted nationally determined contributions, is estimated to be 13.7 per cent above the 2010 level in 2030;

26. *Emphasizes* the urgent need for Parties to increase their efforts to collectively reduce emissions through accelerated action and implementation of domestic mitigation measures in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement;

27. *Decides* to establish a work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition<sup>12</sup> and implementation in this critical decade, and *requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to recommend a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session, in a manner that complements the global stocktake;

**12** “Mitigation” is what countries need to do to reduce climate change, particularly by minimizing greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere. Getting countries to curb emissions is a central aim of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change — but even the United Nations acknowledges that current pledges are far too meager.

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28. *Urges* Parties that have not yet communicated new or updated nationally determined contributions to do so as soon as possible in advance of the fourth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

29. *Recalls* Article 3 and Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 11, of the Paris Agreement and *requests* Parties to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their nationally determined contributions as necessary to align with the Paris Agreement temperature goal by the end of 2022<sup>13</sup>, taking into account different national circumstances;

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**13** One of the key achievements of this summit is speeding up the timeline for climate action. Countries are asked to come back in a year with more ambitious plans for cutting emissions. Under the Paris agreement, countries were generally supposed to submit new or updated plans every five years. Though a flurry of net-zero pledges were announced in the lead-up to COP26, in many of those cases, countries have not planned for significant emissions cuts in the next decade.

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30. *Also requests* the secretariat to annually update the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, referred to in decision 1/CMA.2, paragraph 10, to be made available to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at each of its sessions;

31. *Decides* to convene an annual high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition, beginning at the fourth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

32. *Urges* Parties that have not yet done so to communicate, by the fourth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies referred to in Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Paris Agreement towards just transitions to net zero emissions by or around mid-century, taking into account different national circumstances;

33. *Invites* Parties to update the strategies referred to in paragraph 32 above regularly, as appropriate, in line with the best available science;

34. *Requests* the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies referred to in Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Paris Agreement to be made available to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session;

35. *Notes* the importance of aligning nationally determined contributions with long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies;

36. *Calls upon* Parties to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, recognizing the need for support towards a just transition<sup>14</sup>;

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<sup>14</sup> The explicit mention of “coal” and “fossil fuel subsidies” is a break from previous U.N. climate agreements. The provision was watered down over the course of the summit – conditioned with references to “unabated” coal used for power generation

and “inefficient” subsidies. The same paragraph now also recommends “support toward a just transition,” referring to a need to help workers in polluting industries move to new careers. And in a last-minute change, China and India, speaking on behalf of a group of other developing countries, pushed to change “phase-out” to “phase-down.” But it is a surprise that the phrase made it through to the final draft at all.

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37. *Invites* Parties to consider further actions to reduce by 2030 non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions, including methane;

38. *Emphasizes* the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through forests and other terrestrial and marine ecosystems acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and by protecting biodiversity, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards;

39. *Recognizes* that enhanced support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions;

## **V. Finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for mitigation and adaptation**

40. *Urges* developed country Parties to provide enhanced support, including through financial resources, technology transfer and capacity-building, to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation, in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and *encourages* other Parties to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily;

41. *Notes with concern* the growing needs of developing country Parties, in particular due to the increasing impacts of climate change and increased indebtedness as a consequence of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic;

42. *Welcomes* the first report on the determination of needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris

## Agreement and the fourth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows by the Standing Committee on Finance;

43. *Emphasizes* the need to mobilize climate finance from all sources to reach the level needed to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, including significantly increasing support for developing country Parties, beyond USD 100 billion per year;

44. *Notes with deep regret* that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation has not yet been met<sup>15</sup>, and *welcomes* the increased pledges made by many developed country Parties and the *Climate Finance Delivery Plan: Meeting the US\$100 Billion Goal* and the collective actions contained therein;

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<sup>15</sup> Rich countries have failed to follow through on their pledge, made more than a decade ago, to provide \$100 billion annually to help developing nations transition to greener economies and adapt to climate change. The pledge was supposed to be fulfilled starting in 2020. Now it may not be until 2023. The funding shortfall has fueled mistrust among developing nations, which historically have done less to fuel climate change but are disproportionately vulnerable to its consequences. Many developing nations have said their climate pledges are conditional on receiving outside support.

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45. *Calls upon* developed country Parties to provide greater clarity on their pledges referred to in paragraph 44 above through their next biennial communications under Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement;

46. *Urges* developed country Parties to fully deliver on the USD 100 billion goal urgently and through to 2025 and *emphasizes* the importance of transparency in the implementation of their pledges;

47. *Urges* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, multilateral development banks and other financial institutions to further scale up investments in climate action and *calls for* a continued increase in the scale and effectiveness of climate finance from all sources globally, including grants and other highly concessional forms of finance;

48. *Re-emphasizes* the need for scaled-up financial resources to take into account the needs of those countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and in this regard *encourages* relevant multilateral institutions to consider how climate vulnerabilities should be reflected in the provision and mobilization of concessional financial resources and other forms of support, including special drawing rights;

49. *Welcomes with appreciation* the initiation of deliberations on a new collective quantified goal on climate finance, and *looks forward* to the ad hoc work programme established under decision -/CMA.3 and to engaging constructively in the actions contained therein;

50. *Underscores* the importance of the deliberations referred to in paragraph 49 above being informed by the need to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty and to make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries and building on the work of the Standing Committee on Finance;

51. *Emphasizes* the challenges faced by many developing country Parties in accessing finance and *encourages* further efforts to enhance access to finance, including by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism;

52. *Notes* the specific concerns raised with regard to eligibility and ability to access concessional forms of climate finance, and *re-emphasizes* the importance of the provision of scaled-up financial resources, taking into account the needs

of developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;

53. *Encourages* relevant providers of financial support to consider how vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change could be reflected in the provision and mobilization of concessional financial resources and how they could simplify and enhance access to finance;

54. *Underscores* the urgency of enhancing understanding and action to make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development in a transparent and inclusive manner in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication;

55. *Calls upon* developed country Parties, multilateral development banks and other financial institutions to accelerate the alignment of their financing activities with the goals of the Paris Agreement;

56. *Acknowledges* the progress made on capacity-building, particularly in relation to enhancing the coherence and coordination of capacity-building activities towards the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement;

57. *Recognizes* the need to continue supporting developing country Parties in identifying and addressing both current and emerging capacity-building gaps and needs, and to catalyse climate action and solutions to respond;

58. *Welcomes* the outcomes of the “COP26 Catalyst for Climate Action” and the strong commitments made by many Parties to take forward action on capacity-building;

59. *Also welcomes* the joint annual reports of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network for 2020 and 2021, and *invites* the two bodies to strengthen their collaboration;

60. *Emphasizes* the importance of strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer for the implementation of mitigation and adaptation action, including accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation, and the importance of predictable, sustainable and adequate funding from diverse sources for the Technology Mechanism;

## VI. Loss and damage

61. *Acknowledges* that climate change has already caused and will increasingly cause loss and damage<sup>16</sup> and that, as temperatures rise, impacts from climate and weather extremes, as well as slow onset events, will pose an ever-greater social, economic and environmental threat;

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<sup>16</sup> Even if the world stops burning fossil fuels tomorrow, even if countries spend trillions of dollars adapting, the catastrophic consequences of warming are already here. Homes will be lost. Farmland will be damaged. Lives and livelihoods will be destroyed.

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62. *Also acknowledges* the important role of a broad range of stakeholders at the local, national and regional level, including indigenous peoples and local communities, in averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

63. *Reiterates* the urgency of scaling up action and support, as appropriate, including finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, for implementing approaches for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change in developing country Parties<sup>17</sup> that are particularly vulnerable to these effects;

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<sup>17</sup> The countries that contributed the least to climate change will suffer the most. For decades, the world has paid mostly lip service to these unavoidable and unequal impacts, collectively known as “loss and damage.” But improvements in climate



science have increasingly made it possible to pinpoint the role of climate change in disasters. At COP26, representatives of hard-hit areas pushed for compensation for harms they can now directly link to wealthy countries' emissions. But rich countries don't want to be held liable. The issue remains unresolved.

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64. *Urges* developed country Parties, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, United Nations entities and intergovernmental organizations and other bilateral and multilateral institutions, including non-governmental organizations and private sources, to provide enhanced and additional support for activities addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

65. *Recognizes* the importance of demand-driven technical assistance in building capacity to implement approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

66. *Welcomes* the further operationalization of the Santiago network<sup>18</sup> for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including the agreement on its functions and process for further developing its institutional arrangements;

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<sup>18</sup> In 2019, nations agreed to set up a technical assistance program, known as the Santiago Network, to help countries deal with “loss and damage” — unavoidable, irreversible harms caused by climate change. The program was established in name only, without staff or funding. In a statement summarizing the Glasgow conference, Patricia Espinosa, executive secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, said the agreement's inclusion of language encouraging countries to build up the Santiago Network was one of the significant accomplishments of the pact.

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67. *Decides* that the Santiago network will be provided with funds to support technical assistance for the implementation of relevant approaches to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change in developing countries in support of the functions set out in paragraph 9 of decision -/CMA.3;

68. *Also decides* that the modalities for the management of funds provided for technical assistance under the Santiago network and the terms for their disbursement shall be determined by the process set out in paragraph 10 of decision -/CMA.3;

69. *Further decides* that the body providing secretarial services to facilitate work under the Santiago network to be determined in accordance with paragraph 10 of decision -/CMA.3 will administer the funds referred to in paragraph 67 above;

70. *Urges* developed country Parties to provide funds for the operation of the Santiago network and for the provision of technical assistance as set out in paragraph 67 above;

71. *Acknowledges* the importance of coherent action to respond to the scale of needs caused by the adverse impacts of climate change;

72. *Resolves* to strengthen partnerships between developing and developed countries, funds, technical agencies, civil society and communities to enhance understanding of how approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage can be improved;

73. *Decides* to establish the Glasgow Dialogue between Parties<sup>19</sup>, relevant organizations and stakeholders to discuss the arrangements for the funding of activities to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change, to take place in the first sessional period of each year of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, concluding at its sixtieth session (June 2024);

**19** Developing countries had initially proposed establishing a “facility” that would provide financial support to communities suffering irreversible damage from climate impacts. But, in keeping with past U.N. talks, wealthy nations balked at language that would hold them accountable for loss and damage payments. The “facility” was changed to a “dialogue,” though some delegates said Saturday they would push for real financial commitments at next year’s COP in Egypt.

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74. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to organize the Glasgow Dialogue in cooperation with the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts;

## VII. Implementation

75. *Resolves* to move swiftly with the full implementation of the Paris Agreement;

76. *Welcomes* the start of the global stocktake, and *expresses its determination* for the process to be comprehensive, inclusive and consistent with Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and decision 19/CMA.1, in the light of paragraph 5 above;

77. *Encourages* the high-level champions to support the effective participation of non-Party stakeholders in the global stocktake;

78. *Recalls* the Katowice climate package, and welcomes with appreciation the completion of the Paris Agreement work programme<sup>20</sup>, including the adoption of decisions on the following:

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**20** During 2018’s COP24 conference in Katowice, Poland, countries attempted to finalize the rules they would follow to achieve the goals set forth in the Paris agreement. COP26 saw the completion of the Paris rulebook, meaning that by 2024 all countries will have to report detailed data on their greenhouse gas emissions.

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(a) Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);

(b) Methodological issues relating to the enhanced transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);

(c) Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);

(d) Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);

(e) Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);

(f) Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);

(g) Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);

79. *Urges* Parties to swiftly make the necessary preparations for ensuring timely reporting under the enhanced transparency framework in line with Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and the timelines set out in decision 18/CMA.1;

80. *Acknowledges* the call from developing countries for increased support for the implementation of the enhanced transparency framework under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement in a timely, adequate and predictable manner;

81. *Welcomes* decision -/CP.26, which encourages the Global Environment Facility, as part of the eighth replenishment process, to duly consider ways to

increase the financial resources allocated for climate, and *recognizes* that the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency, established pursuant to decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 84, will continue to support developing country Parties, upon their request, in building their institutional and technical capacity for the enhanced transparency framework;

82. *Welcomes* decision -/CMA.3, which requests the Global Environment Facility to continue to facilitate improved access to the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency by developing country Parties, and *encourages* the Global Environment Facility to work closely with other institutions and initiatives to enhance these efforts, such as the Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance and the “COP26 Catalyst for Climate Action”;

83. *Takes note* of the revised terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts, contained in the annex to decision -/CP.26;

84. *Recognizes* the need to take into consideration the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly developing country Parties, in line with Article 4, paragraph 15, of the Paris Agreement;

85. *Also recognizes* the need to ensure just transitions that promote sustainable development and eradication of poverty, and the creation of decent work and quality jobs, including through making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development, including through deployment and transfer of technology, and provision of support to developing country Parties;

## **VIII. Collaboration**

86. *Notes* the urgent need to close the gaps in implementation towards the goals of the Paris Agreement and *invites* the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene world leaders in 2023 to consider ambition to 2030;

87. *Recognizes* the importance of international collaboration on innovative climate action, including technological advancement, across all actors of society, sectors and regions, in contributing to progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement;

88. *Also recognizes* the important role of non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, indigenous peoples, local communities, youth, children<sup>21</sup>, local and regional governments and other stakeholders, in contributing to progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement;

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<sup>21</sup> In a video address at the close of the conference, United Nations Secretary General António Guterres acknowledged young people, Indigenous communities, female leaders and all those leading the “climate action army.” He said they should “Never give up. Never retreat. Keep pushing forward. I will be with you all the way.” Youth climate activists like Greta Thunberg have inspired millions of young people around the world to join their call for greater action on climate change.

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89. *Welcomes* the improvement of [the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action](#) for enhancing ambition, the leadership and actions of the high-level champions, and the work of the secretariat on the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform to support accountability and track progress of voluntary initiatives;

90. *Also welcomes* [the high-level communiqué](#) on the regional climate weeks and *encourages* the continuation of regional climate weeks where Parties and non-Party stakeholders can strengthen their credible and durable response to climate change at the regional level;

91. *Urges* Parties to swiftly begin implementing the Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment, respecting, promoting and considering their respective obligations on human rights, as well as gender equality and empowerment of women;

92. *Also urges* Parties and stakeholders to ensure meaningful youth participation and representation in multilateral, national and local decision-making processes, including under the Paris Agreement;

93. *Emphasizes* the important role of indigenous peoples' and local communities' culture and knowledge in effective action on climate change, and *urges* Parties to actively involve indigenous peoples and local communities in designing and implementing climate action;

94. *Expresses its recognition* of the important role the observer organizations play, including the nine non-governmental organization constituencies, in sharing their knowledge, and their calls to see ambitious action to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement and in collaborating with Parties to that end;

95. *Encourages* Parties to increase the full, meaningful and equal participation of women in climate action and to ensure gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation, which are vital for raising ambition and achieving climate goals;

96. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in this decision;

97. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.



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